Classical one-time-pad key can only be used once. We show in this Letter that with quantum mechanical information media classical one-time-pad key can be repeatedly used. We propose a specific realization using single photons. The reason why quantum mechanics can make the classical one-time-pad key repeatable is that quantum states can not be cloned and eavesdropping can be detected by the legitimate users. This represents a significant difference between classical cryptography and quantum cryptography and provides a new tool in designing quantum communication protocols and flexibility in practical applications.
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Quantum mechanics predictions can sometimes contradict our experiences and our classical physics knowledge with surprises. It is well-known that quantum mechanics allows for efficient solution to difficult problems in classical computation, for instance in Shor algorithm [1] and Grover's algorithm [2] . In the fields of cryptography, quantum key distribution(QKD) provides unconditionally secure distribution of secret keys between two remote parties [3] [4] [5] [6] . Since the early QKD protocols [3, 7] , research in QKD has been progressing very fast [8] . The secure key produced from QKD can be combined with the Vernam one-time-pad [9] , which has been proven unconditionally secure [10] . In the Vernam cipher scheme, the secret key and the message have the same length, and the cipher text is the simple modulo 2 sum of the message and the keys.
The Vernam one-time-pad key can only be used once in classical cryptography. To an eavesdropper Eve, the message M is unknown to her, and the entropy of the message space is H(M ). Suppose Eve gets hold of the ciphertext C and her entropy about the M becomes H C (M ). With perfect secrecy, H(M ) = H C (M ), i.e., the possession of the ciphertext does not provides Eve any new information about the message. Vernam cipher is just such a system. However when the same key is used twice, the perfect secrecy condition is no longer satisfied. For instance if the first message were obtained by Eve due to one reason or another, she would have complete knowledge of the key by subtracting the intercepted ciphertext with the message. Hence the repeated use of the onetime-pad key in classical cryptography is terrifying and there have been hard lessons in history of the disastrous consequences of the repeated use of a one-time-pad key. However, in this Letter, we will show that classical onetime-pad can be used repeatedly with quantum mechanical carriers with unconditional security. The essential cause for the repeated use of the key is the inability of Eve to intercept the ciphertext and the capability of communicating parties to detect Eve. The significance of this work is twofold. First, the repeated use of a classical onetime-pad key itself represents conceptual liberation from the constraints laid down by classical cryptography. This may provide new avenue for cryptography. Second, this property may help present studies of quantum communications, both in protocol design and in practical realizations.
First we briefly check the basic ingredients in a QKD protocol that makes QKD secure. They are: 1) the quan-tum non-cloning theorem [11] ; 2) quantum state collapse after measurement; 3) non-locality of entangled composite quantum systems [12] ;(4) classical randomness. Usually a QKD protocol involves simultaneously more than one of the ingredients mentioned above. For example, the BB84 QKD protocol uses ingredient 2) and 4). The current practice in quantum communication is that first a common key between two users is established by a QKD, and then the message is encrypted with the key using the Vernam cipher. The ciphertext is transmitted from one user to the other user through a classical channel. Recently, some authors have proposed to transmit secret messages directly through a quantum channel [13] [14] [15] [16] , which condenses the two transmissions into a single one. In these schemes, the key is used only once where in the former the ciphertext is transmitted through a classical channel, whereas in the latter the ciphertext is transmitted through a quantum channel.
Suppose Alice and Bob have already a sequence of common secret key, and they have access to a quantum channel. Can they use the key repeatedly? We will show with a explicit protocol that the answer is yes.
Like the BB84 QKD protocol, there are two sets of measuring-basis(MB), the plus-measuring-basis (plus-MB):
and the cross-measuring-basis (cross-MB), i.e.
where |H and |V are the horizontal and vertical polarization states respectively. The quantum crypto-system contains six steps, the schematic illustration is shown in Fig.1 . We assume ideal noiseless channel. For completeness, we also include the step to establish a common key sequence. We assume that Alice is transmitting a message to Bob.
Step 1: Establishing a classical one-time-pad key. Alice and Bob first establish a sequence of secret key. There are various means to achieve this. One natural choice is to use the BB84 QKD protocol [3] to produce a common secret key between Alice and Bob. The result is a sequence of random binary numbers.
Step 2: Modified message sequence preparation. A secret message can be translated into a sequence of N m binary numbers, and the message sequence is denoted as M m . The modified message sequence contains the message sequence and a sampling sequence of binary numbers. Alice chooses a sufficient large sequence of N s random binary numbers as sampling bits, denoted by M S . Alice inserts each of these N s binary numbers into the message bit sequence at random positions. This comprises a modified message sequence of N = N m + N s binary numbers. This modified message sequence is denoted as M N . Alice records the position and the value of these N s binary numbers in this modified message sequence M N .
Step3: Encoding the modified message sequence with the classical one-time-pad key. Take 2N = 2(N m + N s ) binary numbers from the one-time-pad key to form a basis-key sequence, denoted by Q N . Alice and Bob agree beforehand that 00, 11, 01 and 10 in the classical one-time-pad base-key correspond to quantum states |H , |V , |u and |d respectively, namely 00 → |H , 11 → |V , 01 → |u , 10 → |d .
Alice prepares a sequence of N single photons in states according to the respective values in the basis-key Q N . The encoding of the modified message sequence is realized by two unitary operations
If the i-th bit in the modified message sequence is a 0, then Alice performs unitary operation U 0 on the i-th single photon, and if the i-th bit in the modified message sequence is a 1, then Alice performs U 1 operation on the i-th single photon. The nice feature of this set of encoding operation is they do not change the states in one measuring-basis into another measuring-basis,
After encoding the corresponding bit value in the modified message sequence on the single photon, Alice sends the single photon to Bob. The single photons now carry the ciphertext.
Step 4: Decrypting the ciphertext of the modified message sequence by Bob. After receiving the single photons, Bob measures each single photon in appropriate measuring-basis as Bob has the same one-time-pad key as Alice so he knows the state of each photon before the encoding. After the measurement, Bob knows the encoding operation on each photon, and hence knows the corresponding bit value in the modified message sequence M N .
Step 5: Alice and Bob check eavesdropping and Bob obtains the message sequence. Alice announces publicly the positions of the sampling bits in the modified message sequence. With this information, Bob publicly announces the bits values of these sampling bits, that is the encoding operations of the sampling photons. It should be emphasized that the information about the states of the photons are not disclosed, either before the encoding nor after the encoding. Alice then compares these results with her own values, and she determines the error rate. With the error rate, she can judge whether there is eavesdropping in the transmission. Under ideal condition, there should be no error if there is no eavesdropping.
If the error rate is high, then there is eavesdropper in the transmission. They halt the process.
Step 6: Constructing a classical one-time-pad key from the used classical one-time-pad key. Under ideal condition, if the error rate is zero, then Alice and Bob can drop the sampling bits that have been chosen for eavesdropping and keep the remaining bits in the classical one-time-pad keys as a new classical one-time-pad key to be used later.
We now discuss the security of this reusable classical one-time-pad key, Q k . We do not prove the security here, but rather point only to the similarity with the classical one-time pad [9] and BB84 QKD [3] which are known to be unconditionally secure [4] [5] [6] 10] .
First we notice that the encoding of secret messages in the step 3 is identical to the process in a classical one-time-pad where the text is encrypted with a random key as the states of the photons in the quantum key is completely random to Eve, hence the conditional entropy of the message H c (M ) is identical to the entropy of the message itself H(M ), H c (M ) = H(M ), i.e., the access of the ciphertext by Eve does not increase any information about the message. This is completely secure according to Shannon [10] . However, as has been discussed in Ref. [16] , the quantum crypto-system, is even more secure than the classical one-time-pad scheme in the sense that Eve can not even get the cipher-text completely, as she does not know the photons' MBs, and any eavesdropping will 1) destroys the quantum state; 2) be detected by Alice and Bob. Thus the security of this quantum crypto-system depends entirely on the security of the quantum key. If this one-time-pad key were lost to Eve, she could simply measure each of the single photon with the correct measuring-basis and escape detection. We will discuss the security issue of this quantum crypto-system. We limit our discussion to individual attack first [17] [18] [19] and discuss the security of Q k .
In the ideal condition, any eavesdropping done by Eve will be detected by Alice and Bob. Moreover, Eve can get nothing about the ciphertext. The process for eavesdropping check in this quantum crypto-system is similar as that for BB84 QKD protocol [3] in which the optimal individual attack of Eve can be realized by an unitary operation U T B on the travelling photon sent to Bob with a probe whose initial state is |0 , i.e.,
where |ξ and ξ are two eigenvectors of two-level operator, such as σ z or σ x , and θ ∈ [0, π/4] represents the strength of the eavesdropping [18, 20, 21] . The average mutual information I AE between Eve and Alice is limited to [18] ,
where the function
, and D = 1 2 sin 2 θ is the error rate introduced by Eve's action in the result.
It is useful to emphasize that I 0 is the information bound Eve can obtain about the encoding operation sent by Alice under the condition that Alice and Bob publish the information about the measuring-basis. When D = 0.25, I 0 ≈ 0.645 is the maximum.
In the protocol described above, Alice does not publish any information of the single photons of the message, and Eve's information I ′ AE is less than I 0
where I AB is the mutual information between Alice and Bob. It is obvious that Eve cannot get a useful information about the message and her action will be detected. When producing the one-time-pad from the used one, Alice and Bob discard M S sequence which has been publicly announced. They use the one-time pad repeatedly only when they ascertain the quantum channel is secure. So Eve can get nothing about the message without information about it.
A special case is that Eve eavesdrops the quantum channel with some information about the secret message known in advance. The goal is to obtain some information about the classical one-time key. It is of interest that even though Eve knows the message before hand and attacks the quantum communication with cipher-text strategy, she still cannot get the one-time-pad key completely as she cannot get the information about the quantum states of single photons without their MBs. This is certainly different from that in classical cryptography. In this time, the information I
′′
AE is just what Eve can get about the basis-key of the single photon when she knows the encoding operation in advance.
Similar to the BB84 QKD scheme in which Eve wants to obtain some information about the raw key and monitors the quantum channel [22] , Eve eavesdrops the quantum communication for the classical one-time pad key. The mutual information I ′′ AE is just the information that Eve can get about the measuring-basis of the single photons. Eve can get more information about the raw key in BB84 QKD than that in this crypto-system for the MBs of the single photons as she can do exact measurement on her probe system and get the result with the MBs published by Alice and Bob in BB84 QKD, which does not happen in this crypto-system. So we can get the relation [22] where I AEBB84 is mutual information between Alice and Eve in BB84 QKD, the maximum value is D m ≤ 0.25. As pointed out in Ref. [22] , for small D m ,
where ln2 is the natural logarithm of 2. For example, when D m ≤ 0.05, I
′′ AE < 0.41. As discussed above, Eve cannot steals the secret message if she only obtains the information I MB , but it is helpful for her to eavesdrop the quantum signal in the next time. This is just the reason that our quantum crypto-system can repeatedly use the quantum key conditionally.
In ideal implementation of this quantum cryptosystem, single photon source is required. A single photon source is principally available [23] . Even without single photon source, ideal channels ad perfect detectors, this repeatable one-time-pad scheme can also be used. Error correcting techniques are necessary then. There have already been quite a few good correcting codes, for instance, in references [24] [25] [26] . Comparing with the quantum one-time-pad secure direct communication scheme in Ref. [16] , the advantage of this protocol is obvious: there is no need to store quantum states, and the single photons need be sent only in one-way, as compared with that in Ref. [16] with two-ways.
With a noise quantum channel, this crypto-system can be used to quantum direct communication with some other quantum and classical techniques if the noise is low. For example Alice and Bob do privacy amplification [27] on the classical one-time-pad key for cancelling the information of the key leaked to Eve. The process is just a map in which k bits of key is changed to k ′ , where k > k ′ . Surely, this crypto-system maybe not suitable for direct communication if the noise and loss are high as there are no advantages compared with QKD. In the condition, it is suitable for QKD similar to the ways in Refs [28, 29] .
To summarize, this quantum crypto-system can be used for transmission of secret message securely, same as QSDC even though it is just a prototype. Also, it can be used for QKD unconditionally securely. In this quantum crypto-system, the quantum key, a sequence of the quantum states of single photons can be used repeatedly and is mapped to a classical key which is stored in classical way.
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